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ABSTRACT
The problem of online fraud detection can often be formulated as
mining a bipartite graph of users and objects for suspicious patterns.
The edges in the bipartite graph represent the interactions between
users and objects (e.g., reviewing or following). However, smart
fraudsters use sophisticated strategies to influence the ranking al-
gorithms used by existing methods. Based on these considerations,
we propose FraudTrap, a fraud detection system that addresses the
problem from a new angle. Unlike existing solutions, FraudTrap
works on the object similarity graph (OSG) inferred from the orig-
inal bipartite graph. The approach has several advantages. First,
it effectively catches the loosely synchronized behavior in face of
different types of camouflage. Second, it has two operating modes:
unsupervised mode and semi-supervised mode, which are naturally
incorporated when partially labeled data is available to further im-
prove the performance. Third, all algorithms we design have the
near-liner time complexities and apply on large scale real-world
datasets. Aiming at each characteristics of FraudTrap, we design
corresponding experiments that show FraudTrap outperforms other
state-of-the-art methods on eleven real-world datasets.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Fraud has severely detrimental impacts on the business of social
networks and other web online applications [26]. A user can become
a fake celebrity by purchasing “zombie followers” on Twitter. A
merchant can boost his reputation through fake reviews on Amazon.
This phenomenon also conspicuously exists on Facebook, Yelp and
TripAdvisor, etc. In all the cases, fraudsters try to manipulate the
platform’s ranking mechanism by faking interactions between the
fake accounts they control (fraud users) and the target customers
(fraud objects).
These scenarios are often formulated as a bipartite graph of
objects and users. We define an object as the target a user could
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM
must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish,
to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a
fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
WWW’19, 2019,
© 2019 Association for Computing Machinery.
ACM ISBN 978-x-xxxx-xxxx-x/YY/MM. . . $15.00
Figure 1: (1) Loosely synchronized behavior: fraudsters in-
crease the number of fraud users and multiplex them. (2)
Camouflage: fraud users create edges to normal objects.
interact with on a platform. Depending on the application, an ob-
ject can be a followee, a product or a page. An edge corresponds to
the interaction from a user to the object (e.g., reviewing or follow-
ing). Detecting fraud in the bipartite graph has been explored by
many methods. Since fraudsters rely on fraudulent user accounts,
which are often limited in number, to create fraudulent edges for
fraud objects’ gain [16], previous methods are mainly based on two
observations: (1) fraud groups tend to form dense subgraphs in
the bipartite graph (high-density signal) , and/or (2) the subgraphs
induced by fraud groups have unusually surprising connectivity
structure (structure signal). These methods mine the bipartite graph
directly for dense subgraphs or rare structure patterns. Their per-
formances vary in real-world datasets.
Unfortunately, smart fraudsters use more sophisticated strate-
gies to avoid such patterns. First, by multiplexing a larger pool
of fraud users, a fraudster can effectively reduce the density of
the subgraph induced by a fraud group. This is called loosely syn-
chronized behavior and leads to the limited performance of the
methods[13, 15, 28, 30, 35] depending on the high-density signal.
Another commonly used technique is to create edges pointing to
normal objects to disguise fraud users as normal ones. This strat-
egy, often called camouflage, alters the connectivity structure of the
bipartite graph and weakens the effectiveness of many approaches
targeting such structure, such as HITS[16, 41], and belief propaga-
tion (BP)[1, 28]. Fig. 1 illustrates these two strategies.
The problem of fraud detection can also be handled using su-
pervised or semi-supervised approaches when (partially) labeled
data are available. [7, 42] provide better performance using a subset
of labeled frauds. [8, 14, 20] build machine learning classifiers to
detect anomalies. These approaches, however, have a number of
limitations. Firstly, it is often very difficult to obtain enough labeled
data in fraud detection due to the scale of the problem and the cost
of investigation. Secondly, they require great effort in feature engi-
neering which is tedious and demands high expertise level. Thirdly,
they often fail to detect new fraud patterns. Finally, even though
some labeled data can provide potentially valuable information for
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fraud detection, it is not straightforward to incorporate them into
existing unsupervised or semi-supervised solutions such as [7, 42].
In this paper, we propose FraudTrap, a graph-based fraud de-
tection algorithm that overcomes these limitations with a novel
change of the target of analysis. Instead of mining the bipartite
graph directly, FraudTrap analyzes the Object Similarity Graph
(OSG) that is derived from the original bipartite graph. There are
two main advantages of our design: (1) fraud objects exhibit more
similar behavior patterns since fraud objects are difficult to gain
edges from normal users, which endows FraudTrap with inherent
camouflage-resistance (Sec. 4.4); (2) since the number of objects is
typically smaller than the number of users [18], working with OSG
reduces computation cost while guaranteeing the effectiveness. In
addition, although FraudTrapworks well without any labels, we can
easily switch to a semi-supervised mode and improve performance
with partial labels.
In summary, our main contributions include:
1) [MetricC]. We build Object Similarity Graph (OSG) by a novel
similarity metric, C-score, which transforms the sparse subgraphs
induced by fraud groups in the bipartite graph into the much denser
subgraphs in OSG, by merging information from unlabeled and
labeled(if available) data.
2) [Algorithm LPA-TK]. We propose a similarity-based cluster-
ing algorithm, LPA-TK, that perfectly fits in OSG and outperforms
the baseline (LPA) in face of noise edges (camouflage).
3) [Metric F ]. Given candidate groups returned by C + LPA-
TK, we propose an interpretable suspiciousness metric, F -score,
meeting the all basic “axioms” proposed in [15].
4) [Effectiveness]. Our method FraudTrap (C + LPA-TK + F )
can operate in two modes: unsupervised and semi-supervised. The
unsupervised mode outperforms other state-of-the-art methods
for catching synchronized behavior in face of camouflage. Semi-
supervised mode naturally takes advantage of partially labeled data
to further improve the performance.
2 RELATEDWORK
To maximize their financial gains, fraudsters have to share or mul-
tiplex certain resources (e.g., phone numbers, devices). To achieve
the “economy of scale”, fraudsters often use many fraudulent user
accounts 1 to conduct the same fraud [3, 5]. As a result, fraud users
inevitably exhibit synchronized behavior on certain features, be it
phone prefixes, or IP subnets. Group-based approaches that detect
frauds by identifying such synchrony are surpassing content-based
approaches (e.g., [27]) as the most effective anti-fraud solutions.
There are three classes of methods.
Unsupervised. Unsupervised methods achieve various perfor-
mance on fraud detection. There are two types of unsupervised
detection methods in the literature.
The first type is based on high-density subgraphs formed by
fraud groups. Mining dense subgraphs in the bipartite graph [30,
35, 37] is effective to detect the fraud group of users and objects
connected by a massive number of edges. Fraudar [13] tries to
find a subgraph with the maximal average degree using a greedy
algorithm. CrossSpot [15] focuses on detecting dense blocks in
a multi-dimensional tensor and gives several basic axioms that
1To be succinct, we use fraud users to refer to these accounts.
Table 1: FraudTrap v.s. existing methods
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a suspiciousness metric should meet. People have also adopted
singular-value decomposition (SVD) to capture abnormal dense
user blocks [17, 33]. However, fraudsters can easily evade detection
by reducing the synchrony in their actions (details in Sec. 3).
The second type is based on rare subgraph structures of fraud
groups. Such structures may include the sudden creation of massive
edges to an object, etc.BP [1, 28] and HITS [9, 10, 16] intend to catch
such signals in the bipartite graph. FraudEagle [1] uses the loopy
belief propagation to assign labels to the nodes in the network
represented byMarkov Random Field (MRF). [34] ranks abnormality
of nodes based on the edge-attribute behavior pattern by leveraging
minimum description length. [12, 19] use Bayesian approaches
to address the rating-fraud problem. SynchroTrap [5] works on
the user similarity graph. In all the cases, it is relatively easy for
fraudsters to manipulate edges from fraud users to conceal such
structural patterns (details in Sec. 3). The common requirement of
parameter tuning is also problematic in practice, as the distribution
of fraudsters changes often.
(Semi-)supervised. When partially labeled data are available,
semi-supervised methods can be applied to anomaly detection. The
fundamental idea is to use the graph structure to propagate known
information to unknown nodes. [11, 22] model graphs as MRFs and
label the potential suspiciousness of each node with BP. [4, 7, 24]
use the random walk to detect Sybils. ADOA[42] clusters observed
anomalies into k clusters and classifies unlabeled data into these k
clusters according to both the isolation degree and similarity. When
adequate labeled data are available, people have shown success
with classifiers such as multi-kernel learning[14], support vector
machines [39] and k-nearest neighbor [38]. However, it is rare to
have enough fraud labels in practice.
3 DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
We provide details why fraudsters can easily evade existing detec-
tion, and present the key ideas of FraudTrap design.
3.1 How Smart Fraudsters Evade Detection?
Reducing synchrony in fraud activities. One of the key signals
that existing fraud detection methods rely on is the high-density
of a subgraph. A naive fraud campaign may reuse some of the
resources such as accounts or phone numbers, resulting in high-
density subgraphs. However, experience shows that fraudsters now
control larger resource pools and thus can adopt smarter strategies
to reduce the synchrony by rotating the fraud users each time. For
example, [16] reports that onWeibo a fraud campaign uses 3 million
fraud accounts, a.k.a. zombie fans, to follow only 20 followees (fraud
objects). Each followee gains edges from a different subset of the
2
followers [16]. The edge density (the ratio of the number of edges
to the maximum number of possible edges given its nodes) of the
subgraph induced by the fraud group is only 3.3 × 10−6, which is
very close to legit value. This strategy, as our experiments in Sec.5.2
will show, effectively reduces the synchrony and deceives many
subgraph-density-based methods [13, 15, 30, 35, 37]. For example,
FRAUDAR [13], it is susceptible to synchrony reduction (details in
Sec.5.2).
Adding camouflage. Fraudsters also try to confuse the detection
algorithm by creating camouflage edges to normal objects, making
the fraud users behave less unusually (Fig.1 (2)). According to [13],
there are four types of camouflages: 1) random camouflage: adding
camouflage edges to normal objects randomly; 2) biased camouflage:
creating camouflage edges to normal objects with high in-degree.
3) hijacked accounts: hijacking honest accounts to add fraudulent
edges to fraud objects. 4) reverse camouflage: tricking normal users
to add edges to fraud objects.
Camouflage severely affects graph-structure-based methods[1,
9, 10, 16, 28], as fraudsters can reshape the structure without many
resources. For example, our experiments in Sec.5.2 demonstrate that
the degrees and HITS scores from Catchsync [16] stops working
even with a moderate number of camouflage edges.
3.2 Our Key Ideas
The fundamental reason that the above two strategies succeed in
deceiving existing detection methods is that they are based on
analyzing the original bipartite graph. The fraudsters can easily
manipulate the graph (both the density and structure) with a large
number of fraud users. Unfortunately, the current black market
makes the number of fraud accounts easy to obtain.
We propose to solve the problem from a different angle. Objects
that pay for fraud activities are similar because the fraudsters must
use their fraud user pool to servemany objects tomake profits. Thus,
instead of analyzing the user-object bipartite graph directly, we
work on the similarity among different objects, which we capture
as an object similarity graph (OSG) whose nodes are all objects and
the edges represent the similarity among these objects. As we will
show, with a carefully designed similarity score, a fraud object is
much more similar with other fraud objects than normal ones and
it is much harder for fraudsters to manipulate the OSG than the
original bipartite graph. This is because, in the OSG, the subgraph G
formed by loosely synchronized behavior is much denser compared
to the corresponding subgraph in the original user-object bipartite
graph and the density of G cannot be altered by camouflage. Figure
3 shows an intuitive example.
Furthermore, we want to leverage the side information available
in different applications instead of letting the algorithm limit the
choices. Specifically, we allow optionally including two types of
information, (partial) fraud labels to offer a semi-supervised mode
for the algorithm and side information of the activities, such as
timestamp and star rating, etc. As we will show, the similarity score
we design is additive for both labels and extra dimensions, so it
is easy to incorporate all available information into the uniform
framework.
… …
Metric C LPA-TK Metric F
Bipartite Graph
(1) (2) (3)
OSG Groups Suspicious
Figure 2: The workflow of FraudTrap (C+LPA-TK+F ).
Table 2: Symbols and Definitions
Symbols Definition
N The set of users, N = {n1, ...,n |N |}
Nl The set of labeled fraud users, Nl ⊂ N
M The set of objects,M = {m1, ...,m |M |}
G The bipartite graph, G = (N ∪M,E)
Gl The bipartite graph, Gl = (Nl ∪M,El )
εi j An edge, εi j ∈ E/El and εi j = (ni ,mj ),ni ∈ N/Nl
Ii The set of edges pointing tomi , Ii ⊂ E
Ili The set of edges pointing tomi , I
l
i ⊂ El
G Object Similarity Graph, G = (M,E)
Ci j Object Similarity Score, Ci j ∈ E and Ci j = (mi ,mj )
G A subgraph of G, G = (M, E)
4 METHODS
In this section, we first provide an overview of the workflow (Figure
2), and thenwe detail each of the three steps of the OSG construction
(C), clustering on OSG (LPA-TK), and spot suspicious groups (F ).
Finally, we provide the intuitions and proofs.
Problem definition and workflow. Consider a bipartite graph
G of a user setN and an object setM, and another bipartite graphGl
formed by a subset of labeled fraud usersNl and the same object set
M. We use an edge ε pointing from a user to an object to represent
an interaction between them, be it a follow, comment or purchase.
FraudTrap works in three stages:
(1) OSG construction: The OSG captures the object similarity,
and we design a metric, C-score, to capture the similarity
between two objects based on user interactions. If Gl is
available, i.e., there are some labeled data, the C-score incor-
porates that data too.
(2) Clustering on OSG: We propose a similarity-based clustering
algorithm that clusters each object into a group based on its
most similar neighbors on OSG.
(3) Spot suspicious groups: Given candidate groups, it is impor-
tant to use an interpretable metric to capture how suspicious
an object/user group is, relative to other groups. We design the
F -score metric for the purpose.
We elaborate these three stages in the rest of this section.
4.1 Stage I: OSG Construction (C)
OSG captures the similarity between object pairs, and thus the first
step is to define the similarity metric,C-score. TheC-score has two
parts, similarity in G (unlabeled) and in Gl (labeled). Formally, we
define the similarity score Ci j between objectmi and objectmj as
Ci j = Si j + Sli j , (1)
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where Si j is the similarity score calculated from the unlabeled G,
while Sli j is obtained from the labeled Gl .
InG , let Ii = {εji : nj ∈ N, (nj ,mi ) ∈ E} be the set of edges point-
ing tomi . Following the definition of the Jaccard similarity [29],
we define the similarity betweenmi andmj , Si j , as
Si j =
Ii ∩ Ij Ii ∪ Ij  . (2)
In Gl , let Ili = {εji : nj ∈ Nl , (nj ,mi ) ∈ El } represent the set of
edges pointing tomi . Then the similarity score Sli j betweenmi and
mj is given by:
Sli j =
Ili ∩ Ilj 
mean(Il ) , (3)
where mean(Il ) is the mean of the set Il = {|Ili ∩ Ilj | : mi ,mj ∈
M, |Ili ∩ Ilj | > 0} .
Leveraging side information. If the side information describing
additional properties of the user-object interaction is available, we
want to include the information in the detection. For example, [3]
reports that the time feature is essential for fraud detection. To
do so, we can augment an edge εi j both in G and Gl using the
following attribute tuple:
εi j = (ni , Attr1, Attr2 · · · ) ,
where Attri can be a timestamp, star-rating, etc. We can append
as many attributes as we need into the tuple and combine the
synchronized behavior into a single score C . We give the following
simple example.
Example 1: In a collection of reviews on Amazon, a review
action (ni ,mj , time1, IP1) indicates that a user ni reviewed product
mj at the time1 on IP1. Then, we use εi j to denote the review action,
εi j = (ni , time1, IP1), and we discardmi for the comparisons in Eq.2
and Eq.3.
Approximate comparisons. Furthermore, we use a customiz-
able =˜ operator to the set intersection and set union in Eq.2 and
Eq.3. For example, considering two edge-attribute tuples ε13 =
(n1, time1) and ε14 = (n1, time2) and let ∆ denote a time range,
then ε1 =˜ ε2 if time1 − time2 < ∆. To make the computation fast,
we quantize timestamps (e.g., hours) and use = operator.
Reducing the C-score computation complexity. In the worst
case, it takes O(|M|2) to compute Ci j ,∀(mi ,mj ) ∈ M, during the
OSG construction.
In practice, we only need to compute the object pair (mi ,mj )
with positive Ci j . We use the key-value approach to compute the
S-score of C-score, described in Algorithm 1 (We use the similar
method to compute the Sl -score ).
Naively, it takes O(|E |) to find all key-value pairs (lines 1-2) and
takes O(|E|) to build G (lines 4-10). However, we expect G to be
sparse because an object only has positive C-scores with a very
small subset of objects in the OSG. Empirically, we evaluate the
edge density in several datasets and find the edge density quite low
in all cases. Section 5.3 provides more details.
Furthermore, due to the Zipf-law, in many real datasets, there are
a few objects with extremely high in-degrees in the bipartite graph.
For example, a celebrity on Twitter (or a popular store on Amazon)
Algorithm 1 Building OSG
Require: Dict
Ensure: S-score
1: for each ni in N do
2: Dict[ni ] = {mj :mj ∈ M, (ni ,mj ) ∈ E}
3: for eachmi ,mj in Dict[ni ] do |Ii ∩ Ij | ← 0
4: for each ni in N do
5: for eachmi ,mj in Dict[ni ] do
6: |Ii ∩ Ij | ← |Ii ∩ Ij | + 1 # becausemi ,mj must share ni .
7: for eachmi ,mj inM do
8: if |Ii ∩ Ij |>0 then
9: |Ii ∪ Ij | ← Deд(mi ) + Deд(mj ) − |Ii ∩ Ij | # Deд(mi )
denotes the in-degree ofmi
10: Si j ← |Ii ∩ Ij |/|Ii ∪ Ij |
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Figure 3: (a) and (b) are the OSG matrixes consisting of 100
objects. ID 1-75 are normal objects sampled from the real-
world dataset [18]. ID 76-100 are fraud objects sampled from
an injected fraud group which consists of 100 users and 50
objects (edge density within the group is 0.066). (a) Fraud ob-
jects form a dense region in OSG (edge density is 1.0). (2) We
add camouflage edges which are 75 percent of fraudulent
edges. Then the dense region formed by the fraud objects
does not change, and camouflage edges only produce tiny
edge weights in camouflage zone.
has a vast number of followers (or customers). In our preprocess-
ing step, we delete these nodes and their incoming edges, as the
most popular objects are usually not fraudulent. This preprocessing
significantly reduces |E | and |E|, and thus the overall computation
time for OSG construction.
4.2 Stage II: Clustering on OSG (LPA-TK)
We propose an algorithm, Label Propagation Algorithm based on
Top-K Neighbors on Weighted Graph (LPA-TK), to cluster nodes of
OSG into groups in face of camouflage. The algorithm is inspired
by LPA[6, 31] that has proven effective in detecting communities
with dense connectivity structure, while LPA only works on the
unweighted graph and does not resist the noise/camouflage edges.
LPA-TK takes the OSG G as input and outputs multiple groups
of similar objects, based on the similarity. Algorithms 2-3 describe
LPA-TK.
Initialization (Line 1-3). First, we assign each node in OSG a
unique label. Second, we color all nodes so that no adjacent nodes
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Algorithm 2 LPA-TK
Require: G = (M,E)
Ensure: Mˆs
1: for eachmi ∈ M do L0i =mi # Initialize labels
2: {M1, ...,Mδ } ← M # Color partition: no two adjacent vertices
share the same color.
3: t ← 0, Mˆs← ∅
4: while the stop criterion is not met do
5: t ← t + 1 # The t-th iteration
6: forM ∈ {M1, ...,Mδ } do
7: for eachmi ∈ M do
8: Lti = f (mi , t) # Algorithm 2 defines f
9: for each l ∈ {Li :mi ∈ M} do
10: Mˆs← Mˆs +{{mi :mi ∈ M,Li = l}}
11: return Mˆs
share the same color. The coloring process is efficient and paral-
lelizable, which takes only O(deд(G)) synchronous parallel steps
[2]. And the number of colors, denoted by δ , is upper bounded by
deд(G) + 1, where deд(G) denotes the maximum degree over all
nodes in G.
Iterations (Line 4-8). In the t-th iteration, each nodemi updates
its label based on the labels of its neighbors (we leave the update
criterion to Algorithm 3). Since the update of a node’s label is
only based on its neighbors, we can simultaneously update all the
nodes sharing the same color. Thus, we need at most δ updates per
iteration. The iteration continues until it meets the stop condition:
∀mi ∈ M :1) Lti = Lt−1i
or 2) Lti , Lt−1i , due to a tie
where Lti is the label ofmi in the t-th iteration, and tie represents a
condition that Lti changes because f returns more than one label
choices (line 8).
Return Groups (Line 9-11). After the iteration terminates, we
partition nodes sharing a same final label into a group.
The key difference of LPA-TK from the original algorithm LPA[6]
is the designing of update criterion f . We consider the three choices
of f .
[Update Criterion: Sum]. Obviously, it is significant to design
f that determines the final results. Based on the update criterion
in [6] that only works on unweighted graphs, we first define f as
the following form:
f (mi , t) = argmax
l ∈{Ltj :mj ∈H(mi )}
∑
mj ∈H(mi )
Ci jh(Ltj , l), (4)
where H(m) is the set of neighbors ofmi and h(Ltj , l) is an indicator
function:
h(Ltj , l) =
{
1 if Ltj == l .
0 otherwise.
According to Eq.4, the label of mi is determined by the sum of
edge weights of each distinct label among its neighbors. Unfortu-
nately, the results of clustering deteriorate as the camouflage edges
increase. Fig.4(a) gives an intuitive example.
[Update Criterian: Max]. To minimize the influence of camou-
flage, we propose another form of f :
f (mi , t) = argmax
l ∈{Ltj :mj ∈H(mi )}
h(l ,mi ) (5)
where H(mi ) is the set of neighbors ofmi and
h(l ,mi ) = max{Ci j :mj ∈ H(mi ),Ltj = l}
Based on Eq.5, the label ofmi is determined by the maximal edge
weight of each distinct label among its neighbors. Although Eq.5
can eliminate the influence of camouflage because the most similar
neighbor of a fraud object should also be fraudulent, the result of
clustering is not well and a group of objects is often divided into
multiple parts. Fig.4(b) gives an example.
B B B B B B
A
A
A
? m
(a)
A
A
A
? m
(b)
B
Normal objects: Fraud objects: Labels: A,B
Figure 4: (a) and (b) describe two possible states when deter-
mine the label of a fraud objectm, in which the thickness of
an edge indicates the C-score. In (a), normal objects labeled
as ‘B’ are connected withm because of camouflage edges. Ac-
cording to Eq.4,m will be labeled as ‘B’, while we expect it to
be ‘A’. In (b), according to Eq.5,m will be labeled as ‘B’, while
we expect it to be ‘A’.
[Update Criterion: Top K]. Based on these considerations, we
propose our final form of f , which can eliminate the influence of
camouflage and keep ideal clustering results, shown in the Algo-
rithm 3.
Algorithm 3 f (mi , t)
Require: K
1: for each l ∈ {Ltj : mj ∈ H(mi )} do # H(mi ) is the set of
neighbors ofmi
2: h[l] ← 0
3: C← {Ci j :mj ∈ H(mi ),Ltj = l}
4: while K > 0 do
5: if |C| ≥ K then
6: h[l] ← h[l] +maxC
7: remove maxC from C
8: K ← K − 1
9: return l if h[l] is the maximum in h
In Algorithm 2, the label ofmi is determined by the sum of Top-K
maximal edge weights of each distinct label among its neighbors.
Note that computing the sum of Top-K maximal edge weights
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(line 4-8) can be optimized to O(|C|), which is as same as the time
complexity of update criteria 4 and 5.
Empirically, we set K as a small integer (e.g., we set K = 3 in our
experiments). Not only does LPA-TK resist camouflage (because
camouflage edges do not change a fraud object’s Top-K most similar
neighbors), but also has good clustering performance (eliminate
the probability that its label determined by one certain neighbors).
In Fig.4(a)m will be labeled as ‘A’, and in Fig.4(b),m will be labeled
as ‘A’, using LPA-TK.
The algorithm is deterministic: it always generates the same
graph partitions whenever it starts with the same initial node labels.
Furthermore, the algorithm converges provably. We formally prove
its convergence with the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1. Given a graph G = (M,E), ∀(mi ,mj ) ∈ M andCi j
∈ E, the algorithm2 uses the updating criterion Algorithm 3 and the
stop condition. Then the algorithm 2 converges.
Proof. Let f (t) be the number of monochromatic edges of G
at t-th iteration step, and f (t) ≤ |E|. In the t-th step, at least one
vertex i changes its label if it does not meet the stop condition. This
indicates that f (t) strictly increases during step t , i.e. f (t) > f (t−1).
Thus the number of iterations is upper bounded by |E|. □
4.3 Stage III: Spot Suspicious Groups (F )
After generating all candidate groups, in this section, we propose
an interpretable suspiciousness metric F to score each group and
find top suspicious groups. Given a fraud groupM ∈ Mˆs (returned
by LPA-TK), let G be the subgraph ofG induced byM, G = (M, E).
Then F follows the form:
FG =
∑
(mi ,mj )∈E Ci j ·
∑
(mi ,mj )∈E |Ii ∩ Ij |
|M|(|M| − 1)2 , (6)
where FG = FG1 · FG2 · |M|,
FG1 =
∑
(mi ,mj )∈E Ci j
|M|(|M| − 1)
and
FG2 =
∑
(mi ,mj )∈E
Ii ∩ Ij 
|M|(|M| − 1) .
Intuitively, FG1 is the average value of C-score on all edges of G,
FG2 is the average number of edges pointed from same users on
all object pairs of G.
The advantage of F -score is that the score obeys the following
good properties including axioms proposed in [15] that all good
algorithms should have. First, we present a well-known metric,
edge density denoted by ρedдe =
|E |
|M |( |M |−1) . And we use ‘↑’, ‘↓’
and ‘=’ to represent ‘increase’, ‘decrease’, and ‘not change’.
(i) AXIOM 1. [Object Size]. Keeping ρedдe ,Ci j , and |Ii ∩ Ij | fixed,
a larger G is more suspicious than one with a smaller size.
(FG1 =) ∧ (FG2 =) ∧ (|M| ↑) ⇒ FG ↑
(ii) AXIOM 2. [Object Similarity]. Keeping ρedдe , |Ii ∩ Ij |, and |M|
fixed, a G with more similar object pairs is more suspicious.
Ci j ↑ ⇒ (FG1 ↑) ∧ (FG2 =) ⇒ FG ↑
(iii) AXIOM 3. [User Size]. Keeping ρedдe , Ci j , and |M| fixed, a
fraud object group (G) connected with more fraud users is
more suspicious.
|Ii ∩ Ij | ↑ ⇒ (FG1 =) ∧ (FG2 ↑) ⇒ FG ↑
(iv) AXIOM 4. [Edge Density]. KeepingCi j , |Ii ∩ Ij |, and |M| fixed,
a denser G is more suspicious.
ρedдe ↑⇒ (FG1 ↑) ∧ (FG2 ↑) ⇒ FG ↑
(v) AXIOM 5. [Concentration.]With the same total suspiciousness,
a smaller G is more suspicious. We define the total suspicious-
ness as
∑
(mi ,mj )∈E (Ci j + |Ii ∩ Ij |).
|M| ↓ ⇒ FG ↑
Note that naive metrics do not meet all axioms. For example,
the edge density is not a good metric because it does not satisfy
AXIOM 1-3 and 5.
Therefore, leveraging F , we can sort groups in descending order
of suspiciousness and catch top suspicious groups.
Given suspicious G, we catch fraud users N from G comprised
of fraud objectsM. The approach follows the form:
N =
⋃
∀mi ,mj ∈M
Hi ∩ Hj (7)
where Hi = {n : ∀n ∈ N, (n,mi ) ∈ E} is the set of users having
edges tomi .
To reduce false alarms in N , we filter out users with low out-
degrees in the subgraph induced by N and M of G, because a
normal user may interact with a few fraud objects by accident
while it is unlikely that it interacts with many fraud objects.
4.4 Analysis
There are four advantages of FraudTrap (C + LPA-TK + F ) :
(1) [Camouflage-resistance]. C + LPA-TK is inherent to resist
camouflage (see Theorem 4.2). However, for LPA[6, 31], its
group detection results can be easily destroyed by camou-
flage (demonstrated in Sec.5.1).
(2) [Capturing Loose Synchrony]. C + LPA-TK + F focuses on
catching loosely synchronized behavior, because its top-K
most similar neighbors do not change in OSG for a fraud
object. However, The density signal can be decreased signifi-
cantly by synchrony reduction [13, 15, 30] (demonstrated in
Sec.5.2).
(3) [Clustering global similarities]. UsingC + LPA-TK, we cluster
nodes based on their similarity. However, [13, 36, 37] group
nodes based on their degree or density features. Fig.7 in
Sec. 5 shows an intuitive example of the clustering quality.
(4) [Scalability].C + LPA-TK cluster all objects into groups in one
run with near-linear time complexity (Sec.4.4). Leveraging
F , we can obtain Top-k suspicious groups, while [13, 36, 37]
only detect a single group per run.
Time complexity. In the OSG construction stage, it takesO(|E |+
|E|) time, based on the optimization (Sec.4.1). In Stage II, the time
cost is the product of the number of iterations and the number of
colors, where the former value has been experimentally indicated
to grow logarithmically with graph size [6] and the latter value is
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bounded by deд(G) + 1. In Stage III, it takes O(|E |) to compute F -
score and catch fraud users ofG, where |E | << |E|. Thus, FraudTrap
has near-linear time complexity.
Capturing loosely synchronized behavior. We use a concrete
example to show why the algorithm can handle loosely synchro-
nized behaviors.
Consider a fraud group with 100 fraud users and 50 fraud objects,
and each fraud user creates 30 edges to random fraud objects. Let
Gor iд denote the induced subgraph induced in the original user-
object bipartite graph, and let GOSG denote the subgraph formed
by fraud objects in OSG. We compute the edge density ρedдe and
FG1 in Eq.(6) for both Gor iд and GOSG . We have
ρedдe (Gor iд) = 0.134 VS ρedдe (GOSG ) = 1 ∧ F 1GOSG = 0.506.
Obviously, the subgraph in OSG is much denser than the original
bipartite graph. Then, let us reduce the synchrony of fraud group
by doubling the number of fraud users and keep the same number
of edges. Then we have
ρedдe (Gor iд) = 0.049 VS ρedдe (GOSG ) = 1 ∧ F 1GOSG = 0.251.
It shows that GOSG is affected slightly by the reduction of syn-
chrony, compared to Gor iд . Furthermore, as normal users hardly
exhibit synchronized behavior, the C-score of normal object pairs
are close to zero. Thus, FraudTrap (C + LPA-TK + F ) is inherently
more effective than approaches relying on density [13, 30, 33].
Camouflage-resistance. FraudTrap is robust to resist different
types of camouflage. There are two reasons. First, the F -scores of
subgraphs induced by fraud object groups do not decrease while
adding camouflage edges. Formally, we give the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Let G denote a subgraph induced by fraud objects
M , andN denote the fraud users.M andN are from a single fraud
group. G does not change when users in N add camouflage edges to
non-fraud objects.
Proof. Letmi andmj denote two fraud objects, (mi ,mj ) ∈ M.
Camouflage only introduces edges between N and normal objects.
It does not add or remove edges pointing toM, which demonstrates
that Ii and Ij in Eq.(1) do not change. ThusCi j ∈ G does not change,
∀(mi ,mj ) ∈ M. □
Second, in OSG, a camouflage edge between a fraud user and a
normal object only produces a quite small value of C-score due to
the denominator of Eq. (1). Fig. 3 (b) provides a typical case. For a
fraud user, this indicates that camouflage edges do not change its
the most top-K similar neighbors. Thus, the subgraphs induced by
fraud groups can be effectively detected by LPA-TK.
Effectiveness of the semi-supervised mode. Given a subset
of labeled fraud users, FraudTrap switches to the semi-supervised
mode. Because of the design of C-score, the partially labeled data
does enhance the similarities between fraud objects in a group and
increase the density of induced subgraph on OSG. Thus, unsur-
prisingly, LPA-TK will more accurately cluster fraud objects into
groups. The experiments in Section 5.2 show the fact.
5 EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We want to answer the following questions in the evaluation:
(1) How does FraudTrap handle loosely synchronized behavior?
(2) Is FraudTrap robust with different camouflage?
(3) Does the semi-supervised mode improve the performance?
(4) Is FraudTrap scalable to large real-world datasets?
Table3 gives the details of datasets used in the paper.
Table 3: Datasets used in experiments.
datasets edges datasets edges
AmazonOffice[18] 53K YelpChi[32] 67K
AmazonBaby[18] 160K YelpNYC[32] 359K
AmazonTools[18] 134K YelpZip[32] 1.14M
AmazonFood[18] 1.3 M DARPA[23] 4.55M
AmazonVideo[18] 583K Registration 26k
AmazonPet[18] 157K
Implementation and existing methods in comparison. We
implemented FraudTrap by Python and we run all experiments
on a server with two 10-core 2.2 GHz Intel Xeon E5 CPUs and
64 GB memory. We compared FraudTrap with the following three
state-of-the-art methods that focus on synchronized behavior with
application to fraud detection.
(1) Fraudar[13] finds the subgraph with the maximal average de-
gree in the bipartite graph using an approximated greedy algo-
rithm. It is designed to be camouflage-resistance.
(2) CatchSync[16] specializes in catching rare connectivity struc-
tures of fraud groups that exhibit the synchronized behavior,
it proposes the synchronicity and normality features based on
the degree and HITS score of the user.
(3) CrossSpot[15] detects the dense blocks which maximize the
suspiciousness metric in the multi-dimensional dataset.
We did our best to fine-tune the hyper-parameters to achieve
their best performances. For CrossSpot, we set the random initializa-
tion seeds as 400, 500 and 600, and chose the one with the maximal
F1-score. Fraudar detects the subgraph with the maximal average
degree and multiple subgraphs by deleting previously detected
nodes and their edges. For all methods, we test the performance
according to the rank of the suspiciousness scores. We compared
the performance using the standard metric, F1 score (the harmonic
mean of precision and recall) across all algorithms.
FraudTrap and FraudTrap+. We run FraudTrap in two modes.
The unsupervised mode (FraudTrap) and the semi-supervised mode
(FraudTrap+) assuming 5% fraud users are randomly labeled. And
in all experiments, we set K = 3 for LPA-TK. In the experiments
regarding [Amazon] datasets, assumeM is a fraud object group
returned by FraudTrap, N is a fraud user group returned by Eq.7.
Then we filtered out n if the out-degree of n is less than 3 in the
subgraph induced by (N ,M) of G, ∀n ∈ N .
Fraud Group Formulation. To simulate the attack models of
smart fraudsters, we used the same method as [13, 16] to generate
labels: inject fraud groups into Amazon datasets ([Amazon] datasets
contain six collections of reviews for different types of commodities
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on Amazon, listed in Table 3.) . To accurately depict the injection,
we formulate the fraud group as the following.
Definition 5.1 (ρ-Synchrony). Given a subgraph G(|N |, |M|, ρ,θ )
induced by a group (N ,M) in G where N is a set of users,M is
a set of objects. (1) For each n ∈ N , ∃W ⊆ M where for each
m ∈ W, the edge (n,m) exists. We define ρ as
ρ =
|W|
|M| ,
where |W| is the mean for all |W|s. (2) For each n ∈ N , ∃W and
W ∩M = ∅, where for eachm ∈ W, the edge (n,m) exists. We
set θ = |W|, and |W| is the mean for all |W|s.
Thus, we use G(|N |, |M|, ρ,θ ) to represent a fraud group, where
ρ represents how loosely its synchronized behavior is and θ de-
notes the number of camouflage edges of each user on average.
Naturally,N andM are labeled as ‘fraudulent’. Before we evaluate
the performance of FraudTrap, we first verify the effectiveness of
LPA-TK.
5.1 Performance of LPA-TK
We recall that LAP-TK has the best clustering performance and
camouflage-resistance. We design this experiment to demonstrate
its performance. We injected a fraud group G(|N | = 200, |M| =
50, ρ = 0.3,θ ) into AmazonOffice dataset, where ρ = 0.3 indicates
that each fraud user of N reviews 15 fraud objects of M and θ
represents the number of camouflage edges of each fraud user on
average. We varied θ to specifically examine the resistance to cam-
ouflage of each clustering algorithm. Let G denote the bipartite
graph formed by injected AmazonOffice and we built the OSG of
G using the method in section 4.1, G. We run each algorithm on G
and evaluated the clustering performance and the performance of
detecting fraud objects, and we used metric F to compute suspi-
ciousness scores of detected groups. Note that we only injected one
group and thusM should be clustered into one group. LPA denotes
the algorithm [6] that treats each edge weight equally, LPA-Sum de-
notes the Algorithm 2 + Eq.4 and LPA-Max denotes the Algorithm
2 + Eq.5.
Table 4: Clustering performance on the [Amazon] datasets.
‘Num’ represents ‘the number of groupsM is divided into. θ
denotes the number of camouflage edges of each fraud user.
θ = 0 θ = 5 θ = 10 θ =20
Num|AUC Num|AUC Num|AUC Num|AUC
LPA 1 |1.0 1 |0.787 1 | 0.727 1 |0.731
LPA-Sum 1 | 1.0 1 | 1.0 1 | 0.787 1 | 0.761
LPA-Max 14 | 0.998 14 | 0.996 13 | 0.998 10 |0.991
LPA-TK 1 |1.0 1 |1.0 1 | 0.999 1| 0.998
Table 4 presents the clustering performance of each algorithm. In
the setup, we expect ‘AUC’ = 1.0 for the perfect performance of de-
tecting fraud objects and ‘Num’ = 1 for the perfect clustering result.
Then we have the following observations: (1) without camouflage
(θ = 0), LPA has an ideal performance. However, once camouflage
is added (θ ≥ 0), its performance is destroyed and LPA clustered all
Figure 5: X-axis: ρ. Performance on detecting fraud objects
Figure 6: X-axis: ρ. Performance on detecting fraud users
objects into one group (thus ‘num’ = 1). (2) LPA-Sum shows weak
camouflage-resistance, and it performance deteriorates as camou-
flage edges increases. (3) LAP-Max resists camouflage obviously.
However, it dividedM into multiple groups, which is not good to
group analysis and inspection. (4) Our algorithm LPA-TK has per-
fect performance. It clustered all fraud objects into one group and
separated the group from legit objects even in face of camouflage.
Thus the experiments demonstrate the advantages of LPA-TK.
5.2 Overall Performance of FraudTrap
To [Amazon] datasets, we designed two fraud group injection
schemes: the first is to examine in detail the performances for
detecting loosely synchronized behavior and resisting camouflage;
the second is for more general performance evaluation.
[Injection Scheme 1]. We chose AmazonOffice as the represen-
tative and injected a fraud group into it with varying configurations.
We set the fraud group as G(|N | = 200, |M| = 50, ρ,θ = |M| × ρ).
We introduced two perturbations according to strategies of smart
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fraudsters: (1) reduce synchrony by decreasing ρ; (2) add camou-
flage edges obeying θ . In G, θ = |M| × ρ indicates that the number
of a node’s camouflage edges is equal to the number of its edges
within the fraud group. And we used all four types of camouflage
as in Sec. 3.
Figure 6 and Figure 5 summarize the performance of detection
fraud objects and fraud users with varying ρ respectively, where the
X-axises are the synchronization ratio ρ (varying from 0 to 0.5), and
the Y-axises are the F1 scores. We have the following observations.
1) Without camouflage and with a high synchronization ratio ρ,
both FraudTrap and CatchSync can catch all injected frauds. 2) At
lower ρ’s, even without camouflage, the performance of Fraudar
decreases significantly, but FraudTrap maintains its performance.
In fact, even for ρ = 0.1, the edge density of the fraud group is only
0.006, FraudTrap can still achieve an F1 score of 0.97. The effects
confirm the robustness of our novel approach (C + LPA-TK + F ). 3)
Camouflage significantly decreases the performance of CatchSync,
but both FraudTrap and Fraudar are resistant to camouflage. Not
surprisingly, FraudTrap performs much better when camouflage
and loose synchronization exist together. 4) As shown in Fig. 6,
without the camouflage and loose synchronization, CatchSync and
Fraudar perform perfectly, but their performance degrade quickly
when ρ decreases with camouflage. 5) CrossSpot performs poorly
for any ρ <= 0.5.
[Injection Scheme 2]. In this experiment, we injected 5 fraud
groups G(|N | = 200, |M| = 50, ρ,θ = |M| × ρ) into AmazonOf-
fice, AmazonBaby, AmazonTools, AmazonFood, AmazonVideo, and
AmazonBook, in which ρ was randomly chosen from [0.2, 0.6], re-
spectively. Out of the 5 fraud groups, 1 of them is no camouflage,
4 out of them are augmented with four types of camouflage re-
spectively. The performances are shown in Table 5 and Table 6
with respect to the detection of fraud objects and users. Overall,
FraudTrap is the most robust and accurate across all variations
and camouflages. The semi-supervised FraudTrap+ with a random
selection of 5% labeled fraud users kept or further improve the
performance, verifying the conclusion in Section 4.4.
Table 5: Performance(AUC) of detecting fraud objects on the
[Amazon] datasets
AmazonOffice AmazonBaby AmazonTools
Fraudar 0.8915 0.8574 0.8764
CatchSync 0.8512 0.8290 0.8307
CrossSpot 0.8213 0.8342 0.7923
FraudTrap 0.9987 0.9495 0.9689
FraudTrap+ 0.9987 0.9545 0.9675
AmazonFood AmazonVideo AmazonBook
Fraudar 0.6915 0.7361 0.8923
CatchSync 0.7612 0.7990 0.7634
CrossSpot 0.7732 0.7854 0.8324
FraudTrap 0.8458 0.8651 0.9534
FraudTrap+ 0.8758 0.8951 0.9644
[Yelp] [32]. YelpChi, YelpNYC, and YelpZip are three datasets col-
lected by [25] and [32], which contain a different number of reviews
for restaurants on Yelp. Each review includes the user who made
Table 6: Performance(AUC) of detect fraud users on the
[Amazon] datasets
AmazonOffice AmazonBaby AmazonTools
Fraudar 0.9015 0.8673 0.8734
CatchSync 0.8732 0.8391 0.8304
CrossSpot 0.8113 0.8422 0.7823
FraudTrap 1 0.9795 0.9796
FraudTrap+ 1 0.9845 0.9855
AmazonFood AmazonVideo AmazonBook
Fraudar 0.7213 0.7451 0.8815
CatchSync 0.7234 0.8243 0.7763
CrossSpot 0.7653 0.7913 0.8532
FraudTrap 0.8637 0.8843 0.9572
FraudTrap+ 0.8818 0.9111 0.9579
the review and the restaurants. Thus the three datasets can be rep-
resented by the bipartite graph G formed by (users, restaurants).
The three datasets all include labels indicating whether each review
is fake or not. Detecting fraudulent users has been studied in [32]
but used review text information. In this paper, we give the evalua-
tion of catching fraudulent restaurants which bought fake reviews
only using the two features. Intuitively, more reviews a restaurant
contains, the more suspicious it is. Therefore, we label a restaurant
as “fraudulent” if the number of fake reviews it receives exceeds
40 (because legit restaurants also may contain a few fake reviews).
Table 7 shows the results. FraudTrap and FraudTrap+ have the best
accuracy on all three datasets.
Table 7: Performance(AUC) on the [YELP] datasets
YelpChi YelpNYC YelpZip
Fraudar 0.9905 0.8531 0.7471
CatchSync 0.9889 0.8458 0.7779
CrossSpot 0.9744 0.7965 0.7521
FraudTrap 0.9905 0.8613 0.7793
FraudTrap+ 0.9905 0.8653 0.7953
[DARPA] DARPA[23] was collected by the Cyber Systems and
Technology Group in 1998. It is a collection of network connections,
some of which are TCP attacks. Each connection contains source IP
and destination IP. Thus the dataset can be modeled as a bipartite
graphG formed by (source IPs, destination IPs) and we evaluate the
performance of detecting malicious source IPs and destination IPs
respectively for each method. The dataset includes labels indicating
whether each connection is malicious or not and we labeled an IP
as ‘malicious’ if it was involved in a malicious connection.
Table 8 presents the corresponding accuracies. Unfortunately,
all baselines have bad performance regarding the detection of mali-
cious IPs. However, FraudTrap and FraudTrap+ exhibit near-perfect
accuracy.[Registration] is a real-world user registration dataset with 26k
log entries from a large e-commerce website. Each entry contains
user ID and two more features, IP subnet and phone-prefix, and an
additional feature timestamp. The dataset includes labels indicating
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Figure 7: The projection of the example dataset using t-SNE on [Registration](See text).
Table 8: Performance(AUC) on the [DARPA] dataset
Detection of source IP destination IP
Fraudar 0.7420 0.7298
CatchSync 0.8069 0.8283
CrossSpot 0.7249 0.6784
FraudTrap 0.9968 0.9920
FraudTrap+ 0.9968 0.9920
whether each entry (user ID) is fraudulent or not and the labels are
obtained by tracking these user accounts for several months, and see
if the user conduct fraud after registration and each fraud user has a
group ID according to obvious attribute sharing among them. Of all
user accounts, 10k are fraudulent. Note that the registration records
do not contain the user-object interaction. We can easily adapt it to
the FraudTrap framework assuming that each registered account
(“object”) has many followers identified by a feature value, IP subnet
or phone-prefix (“user”). Intuitively, an IP subnet can be used in
many registrations, and we model it the same as a user follows
multiple objects in a social network.Moreover, we use FraudTrap* to
denote themode of FraudTrap using the side information timestamp,
and an edge ε = (IPsubnet/phone, timestamp) in FraudTrap*.
Table 9: Performance (AUC) on the [Registration] dataset
Feature: IP Feature: phone
Fraudar 0.7543 0.8742
CatchSync 0.7242 0.8435
CrossSpot 0.6976 0.8231
FraudTrap 0.7658 0.8979
FraudTrap+ 0.7826 0.9113
FraudTrap* 0.7724 0.9215
In our first experiment, we only used the IP subnet feature as the
“user” side of the bipartite graph. The left half of Table 9 summa-
rizes the results. We have the following observations: 1) FraudTrap,
FraudTrap+, and FraudTrap* outperformed all the other existing
methods by a small margin. Taking a closer look at the detection
result, we found that FraudTrap captured a fraud group of 75 fraud
users that all other methods missed. The group is quite loosely
synchronized with the edge density of only 0.14 in the original
bipartite graph. However, having an edge density in 1.0 in OSG
makes it highly suspicious in FraudTrap. 2) FraudTrap+ performed
better than the unsupervised version, even with only 5% of the
fraud labels.
In the second experiment, we used phone features as the “user”
side of the bipartite graph. The right column of Table 9 summarizes
the results. The key observations are: 1) FraudTrap, FraudTrap+,
and FraudTrap* still outperformed other methods. Other baselines
have lower performance because they worked poorly on a group
with 125 false positives (and 75 true positives). This is because
they are based on edge density on the bipartite graph only, and the
groups’ edge density is too big enough to distinguish this group
from the normal.
As an additional benefit, FraudTrap can provide insights on the
grouping of fraud users/objects by their similarity. Fig. 7 plots a
projection of the data onto a 2D space using t-SNE[40] on [Regis-
tration]. We labeled the fraud groups and normal groups according
to the F -score ranking. We plotted the users in the same group
with the same color. We expect that points in the similar groups
are clustered together. We observe that the results from FraudTrap
are much better than Fraudar and CrossSpot, since the users with
the same color cluster better, which is very similar to the clustering
result of labels.
5.3 Scalability
Sparsity of OSG edges. All the three datasets above have low
edge densities. In fact, we also studied several public datasets by the
construction of the OSG and the computation of the edge density.
For example, three datasets in [18] and one dataset in [21] have
edge densities of 0.0027, 0.0027, 0.0028, 0.0013 respectively. With
this density, the time and space complexities of FraudTrap are both
near-linear to the number of edges in the graph.
Based on the dataset AmazonFood, we vary the number of edges
using downsampling, and verify the running time of FraudTrap is
indeed near-linear, as shown in Fig. 8.
6 CONCLUSION
Fraudsters can adapt their behavior to avoid detection. Specifically,
they can reduce their synchronized behaviors and conduct cam-
ouflage to destroy the performance of state-of-the-art methods in
the literature. To solve the challenges, we propose FraudTrap to
capture the more fundamental similarity among fraud objects, and
work on the edge density on the Object Similarity Graph (OSG)
instead. We design FraudTrap with many practical considerations
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Figure 8: FraudTraphas the near-linear time complexity: the
curve (blue) show the running time of FraudTrap, compared
with a linear function (Black)
for the general fraud detection scenario in many applications, such
as supporting a mixture of unsupervised and semi-supervised learn-
ing modes, as well as multiple features. We believe the metrics of
FraudTrap are much harder for fraudsters to manipulate.
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